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THE COURT OF APPEALS 1952-53 TERM
Sufflciency of a Pleading
While the common law construed pleadings strictly against
the pleader,' 2 code pleading introduced the converse principle. 43
A pleading must contain a plain and concise statement of the
material facts." Those facts are material which are necessary to
constitute a cause of action.45
a. Stating a cause of action in slander: Slander has been de-
fined as "the speaking of base and defamatory words which tend
to prejudice another in his reputation, office, trade, business, or
means of livelihood."4 6 By the Rules of Civil Practice, the pleader
in a libel or slander action is relieved from alleging extrinsic facts
showing the particular application of the words to the plaintiff.' 7
In Rager v. McCloskey, 3 plaintiff alleged that defendant, in a
telephone conversation with one of plaintiff's employees, falsely
accused plaintiff of having "committed a fraud" in obtaining a
certain divorce decree, and stated further that he could get plain-
tiff "into quite a mess and even disbarred." The court held these
statements constitute slander per se as they concerned plaintiff
in his .professional capacity as an attorney and could reasonably
be construed so as to injure him in that capacity.4 9 Because this
was a case of slander per se, the pleading of special damages was
not required.50
b. Stating a cause of action in trespass: A trespass may con-
sist, not only in making an unauthorized entry upon private prop-
erty, but in refusing to leave after permission to remain has been
withdrawn.r1 Thus a cause of action was stated against a deputy
sheriff who entered plaintiff's office apparently to serve process, but
who remained after being repeatedly told to leave the premises. 52
A cause of action was also stated against the sheriff, the dep-
uty's superior.. The court pointed out that by the common law,
"a sheriff is liable in trespass for the acts of his deputy committed
in the attempt to execute process, although without his direction
or recognition. "
42. PRAsHxL, NEw YoRx PP.cncE § 128 (1951).
43. C. P. A. § 275. "Construction of pleadings-Pleadings must be liberally con-
strued with a view to substantial justice between the parties."
44. C. P. A. §241.
45. PRASHKr, NEw YoPK PRAcrIcn, §§ 112-114.
46. 33 Am. Jur, Libel and Slander § 3 (1941).
47. Rtn op Crmm PRACTIcE 96.
48. 305 N. Y. 75, 111 N. E. 214 (1953).
49. White v. Barry, 288 N. Y. 37, 41 N. E. 2d 448 (1942) ; Kleeberg v. Sipser, 265
N. Y. 87, 191 N. E. 845 (1034).
50. Sanderson v. Caldwel, 45 N. Y. 398, 405 (1871).
51. Pdople ex rel. Paul v. Warden of City Prison of the City of New York, 190
Misc. 528, 529, 74 N. Y S. 2d 438, 439 (Sup. Ct. 1947) ; Brabazon v. Joannes Bros. Co.,
231 Wis. 426, 286 N. W. 21, 26, (1939) ; See RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 158.
52. Ragers v. McCloskey, supra note 48.
53. People ex rel Kellogg v. Schuyler, 4 N. Y. 173, 181 (1850).
